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20.2 Introducción
Esta tesis de investigación se compone de tres partes principales que analizan la
responsabilidad social empresarial (RSE) de las empresas públicas. Cada parte ofrece un
análisis empírico relacionado con el tema de la RSE y su papel en las organizaciones. Mi
motivación para estudiar la RSE radica en la creciente importancia de la participación de
las empresas en acciones de responsabilidad social y en el desacuerdo de los benecios de las
acciones de RSE en la literatura previa. Estudio la responsabilidad social corporativa con
el n de hacer frente a estos resultados contradictorios y llenar una importante laguna de
investigación enfocando la RSE desde una nueva perspectiva que identica un alineamiento
óptimo entre las necesidades de las partes interesadas y las inversiones de las empresas en
acciones de RSE.
La primera parte de la tesis analiza la relación entre las donaciones caritativas
y el fracaso en los esfuerzos de publicidad de las empresas. Las donaciones caritativas es
una forma común de la lantropía corporativa y representa las iniciativas "altruistas" de
las empresas. Sostengo que las empresas que invierten en este tipo de acciones quieren
señalar una buena imagen de la empresa hacia sus grupos de interés. La dicultad de las
empresas de participar en acciones lantrópicas es medir sus resultados. Propongo que las
acciones sociales corporativas ofrecen benecios intangibles para las empresas, que pueden
ser medidos, por ejemplo, en una disminución del fracaso de los esfuerzos de publicidad de
la empresa. Uso un conjunto de datos de panel de 167 grandes empresas estadounidenses de
la lista S & P 500 que cubre un período de nueve años. Mido los esfuerzos de publicidad de
marcas comerciales que han fracasado como marcas comerciales abandonadas registradas
3en la base de datos Ocina de Patentes y Marcas (USPTO). Esta medida es novedosa en la
literatura de gestión estratégica. Utilizo los datos de Kinder, Lydenberg, y Domini así como
la base de datos (KLD) para medir las donaciones caritativas de las empresas, expresadas
con una variable binaria que toma el valor 1 si la empresa siempre ha dado más que 1,5%
del nal de tres años los ingresos netos antes de impuestos a las donaciones caritativas, o ha
sido especialmente generosos en sus donaciones, y 0 en caso contrario. Los datos nancieros
para controlar los factores adicionales los obtuve de la base de datos Compustat. Utilizo el
método de regresión binomial negativa dada la variable dependiente y la desigualdad media-
varianza. La prueba de Hausman mostró que la especicación de efectos jos es correcta en
mi modelo, por lo tanto, usamos los efectos jos de las empresas y a través del tiempo. Los
resultados muestran evidencia de una relación positiva entre las donaciones caritativas y
una disminución del fracaso en los esfuerzos de publicidad de las empresas. La explicación
de esta relación positiva radica en la capacidad de las acciones sociales de las empresas para
crear un fondo de maniobra positivo moral (Godfrey, 2005) entre los grupos de interés para
que así la empresa proteja e incremente los activos intangibles de la empresa.
La segunda parte de la tesis se centra en las presiones de grupos de interés y su
efecto en las inversiones en RSE de las empresas. Los grupos de interés pueden actuar
como agentes institucionales y pueden inuir en las empresas para participar en acciones
de RSE (por ejemplo, movimientos sociales). En este estudio me centro en la geografía
de las diferentes presiones de los grupos de interés de la empresa y su relación con las
acciones de la empresa en RSE. Distingo los grupos de interés de la empresa entre internos,
locales exteriores y globales exteriores, los cuales pueden inuir en las decisiones de la
4empresa con el n de invertir en acciones altruistas e innovadoras de RSE. Sostengo que
los grupos de interés, dada su ubicación geográca, pueden ejercer diferentes presiones
sobre las empresas. Las empresas, dada la geografía de las presiones, toman en cuenta las
características de sus acciones altruista e innovadoras en RSE con el n de elegir la mejor
respuesta. Las tres características que las empresas consideran al elegir las acciones de RSE
son la visibilidad, la estructura de costos y las limitaciones de tiempo. Mi hipótesis es que
la presión de los grupos de interés internos, representados por los empleados, animará a las
empresas a invertir en innovación y no en acciones altruistas de RSE. Los empleados son
menos sensibles a las limitaciones de tiempo y los costos involucrados, por lo que valoran
más las iniciativas de las empresas que proporcionan una ventaja a largo plazo, como las
acciones innovadoras de RSE. También conjeturo que la presión local externa proveniente
de grupos locales de las ONG puede tener objetivos diferentes, y las empresas consideran
la inversión en acciones altruistas e innovadoras en RSE. Las acciones altruistas son útiles
cuando los grupos locales requieren una respuesta rápida que necesita menos recursos y más
visibilidad pública. Las acciones innovadoras son adecuadas si las presiones de las ONG
locales perduran en el tiempo y requieren una solución a largo plazo, lo que requiere más
recursos invertidos y un marco de tiempo más largo. Es más, la hipótesis de que la presión
externa mundial proviene de los problemas de derechos humanos animará a las empresas
a invertir en acciones altruistas de RSE. En este caso las acciones altruistas de RSE son
adecuadas porque la empresa se enfrenta a una presión lejana, y con el n de responder a ella,
las empresas optan por la solución más rápida y visible para el público. Para estudiar estas
hipótesis utilizo un conjunto de datos de panel de nueve años que incluyen 151 empresas de
5las 500 de las empresas más grandes de Estados Unidos que cotizan en S & P. Las fuentes de
datos fueron las bases de datos de KLD, Wango, y Compustat. Uso el modelo de regresiones
de ecuaciones aparentemente no relacionadascon un enfoque metodológico. Los resultados
conrman nuestras hipótesis y también proporcionan evidencia sobre las presiones de las
partes interesadas dado un determinado lugar geográco que afecta a las acciones de las
empresas en RSE de manera diferente.
La tercera parte de la tesis consiste en un análisis empírico sobre la relación entre
la RSE y los resultados empresariales. La literatura previa en el ámbito de la gestión
empresarial abordó esta relación y encontró resultados mixtos (McWilliams y Siegel, 2000;
Orlitzky et al, 2003;. Waddock y Graves, 1997). Los investigadores encontraron una relación
positiva, negativa o neutral entre la RSE y los resultados empresariales. Los argumentos
de estos diferentes resultados se encuentran, por ejemplo, en las diferencias en las fuentes
de datos, la metodología y los antecedentes teóricos. Por lo tanto, en mi investigación
exploro esta pregunta abierta y me centro en la relación entre la RSE y los diferentes
resultados nancieros al nivel de empresa. Además, también conecto la RSE a los esfuerzos
publicitarios de los de las empresas. Dicho de otra manera, aplico dos categorías diferentes
de las variables de resultados (nancieros y publicitarios) para observar los benecios de las
acciones de RSE relacionados de acuerdo a medidas tangibles e intangibles de las empresas.
En particular, utilizo las siguientes medidas nancieras: retorno sobre activos, retorno
sobre el capital, retorno sobre las ventas, y la q de Tobin. Para medir los esfuerzos de
publicidad utilizo datos anuales sobre las marcas comerciales de las empresas. Basándose en
la literatura anterior, conjeturo una posible una relación positiva, negativa, y neutra entre la
6RSE y los resultados empresariales. Es más, conjeturo una relación positiva entre la RSE y
los esfuerzos publicitarios de las empresas. Uso un conjunto de datos de panel de un período
de nueve años, que incluye 153 empresas del S & P 500. Para construir mi conjunto de
datos y analizar mis hipótesis utilizo cuatro bases de datos secundarias: el KLD, la USPTO,
la calicación de reputación de la revista Fortune y las base de datos Compustat. Uso la
metodología OLS para testar mi primera hipótesis, y la regresión binomial negativa para
testar mi segunda hipótesis. Los resultados muestran que la RSE se relaciona negativamente
con el rendimiento de las empresas nancieras. Este descubrimiento no sugiere que las
empresas no deberían invertir en acciones de RSE, sino que refuerza las premisas de una
evaluación estratégica de la RSE con el n de proporcionar benecios tangibles. Argumento
que esta relación negativa puede ser debida al hecho de que las empresas perciben la RSE
como un coste inicial con el n de construir una ventaja competitiva a largo plazo. Además,
las acciones de RSE no se pueden relacionar directamente con los benecios nancieros de
las empresas, sino más bien con otras medidas de resultado como, por ejemplo, los esfuerzos
de publicidad de las empresas. Por lo tanto para proporcionar evidencia de esta hipótesis
nos jamos en la relación entre la RSE y los esfuerzos de publicidad de las empresas y
encuentramos que están positivamente relacionados entre sí. Este hallazgo conrma nuestra
idea inicial acerca de la capacidad de la RSE para proporcionar benecios intangibles de
las empresas.
70.3 Introduction
The current research thesis consists of three main parts, which analyze the corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) of public rms. Each part provides an empirical analysis
related to the subject of CSR and its role in the organizations. My motivation to study CSR
lies in the increasing importance of rmsengagement in socially responsible actions and in
the disagreement of the benets of CSR actions in the prior literature. I study corporate
social responsibility in order to address these conicting ndings and to ll an important re-
search gap by approaching CSR from a new perspective that identies an optimal alignment
between stakeholder needs and rm investments in CSR actions.
The rst part of the thesis analyses the relationship between charitable giving
and failure in the advertising e¤orts of the rms. Charitable giving is a common form of
corporate philanthropy and represents altruisticinitiatives of the rms. I argue that those
rms which invest in such actions want to signal a good rm image towards their stakeholder
groups. The di¢ culty for rms when engaging in philanthropic actions is to measure their
outcome. I propose that corporate social actions provide intangible benets for the rms,
which can be for instance measured by a decrease in the failure of the rms advertising
e¤orts. I use a panel dataset of 167 large U.S. rms from the S&P 500 rms list covering a
nine years period. I measure failed advertising e¤orts by abandoned trademarks from the
United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) database. This measure is novel in
the strategic management literature. I use data from the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini
database (KLD) to measure charitable giving of the rms, expressed as binary variable,
taking the value 1 if the rm has consistently given over 1.5 % of trailing three-year net
8earnings before taxes to charity, or has been notably generous in its giving, and 0 otherwise.
Financial data to control for additional factors was obtained from the Compustat database.
I use negative binomial regression method given the count dependent variable and the
mean-variance inequality. The Hausman-test approved that the xed-e¤ect specication
is correct in my model, therefore we use rm and time xed e¤ects. The results show
evidence about a positive relationship between charitable giving and decreased failure in
the advertising e¤orts of the rms. The explanation of this positive relationship lies in the
ability of corporate social actions to create a positive moral capital (Godfrey, 2005) among
stakeholders for the rm to protect and increase the rms intangible assets.
The second part of the thesis focuses on the stakeholder pressures and their a¤ect
on the CSR investments of the rms. Stakeholder groups can act as institutional actors and
can inuence rms to engage in CSR actions (e.g. social movements). In this study I focus
on the geography of the di¤erent stakeholder pressures and their relationship to the rms
CSR actions. I consider internal, local external and global external stakeholders which can
inuence rm decisions in order to invest in altruistic and innovative CSR actions. I argue
that stakeholder groups, given their geographic location, can assert di¤erent pressures on
the rms. Firms, given the geography of the pressures, take into account certain character-
istics of their altruistic and innovative CSR in order to choose a best response. The three
characteristics that rms consider when choosing CSR actions are the visibility, the cost
structure and the time constraints. I hypothesize that pressure from internal stakeholder
groups, represented by the employees, will encourage rms to invest in innovative rather
than altruistic CSR actions. Employees are less sensible to time constraints and to the costs
9involved and therefore value more those initiatives of the rms that provide a long-term
advantage, such as innovative CSR. I also hypothesize that local external pressure coming
from local NGO groups have di¤erent aims and rms consider investing in both altruistic
and innovative CSR actions. Altruistic actions are useful when local groups require a quick
answer that needs less resources and more public visibility. Innovative actions are suitable
if local NGO pressures are persistent and require a long-term solution, which infers more
resources invested and a longer time frame. Moreover, I hypothesize that global external
pressure coming from human rights concerns will encourage rms to invest in altruistic
CSR actions. In this case altruistic CSR actions are suitable because the rm faces a dis-
tant pressure, and, in order to respond to it, the rm choses the most publicly visible and
quicker solution. To study these hypotheses I use a panel dataset over nine years and in-
clude 151 rms from the S&P 500 list of the largest U.S. rms. The data sources were
the KLD database, Wango database and the Compustat database. I use the seemingly
unrelated regressions equations model as a methodological approach. The results conrm
our hypotheses and provide evidence about stakeholder pressures given a certain geographic
location a¤ecting di¤erently rm CSR actions.
The third part of my thesis consists of an empirical analysis about the relationship
between CSR and rm performance. Prior literature in the eld of management approached
this link and found mixed results (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003;
Waddock and Graves, 1997). Researchers found positive, negative or neutral relationship
between CSR and rm performance. The arguments of these di¤erent results lie for instance
in the di¤erences in data sources, methodology and theoretical background. Therefore, I
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address this question in my research and focus on the relationship between CSR and di¤erent
nancial outcomes on the rm level. Additionally, I also connect CSR to the the advertising
e¤orts of the rms. To put it di¤erently, I apply two di¤erent categories of outcome variables
(nancial and advertising) to observe the benets of CSR actions related accordingly to
tangible and intangible rm measures. In particular, I use the following nancial measures:
return on assets; return on equity; return on sales; and Tobins q. To measure advertising
e¤orts I use data on led trademarks of the rms on a yearly basis. Relying on the prior
literature, I hypothesize a possible positive, negative and neutral relationship between CSR
and rm performance. Moreover, I hypothesize a positive relationship between CSR and the
advertising e¤orts of the rms. I use a panel dataset of a nine year period and include 153
rms from the S&P 500 list of rms. To construct my dataset and analyze my hypotheses
I use four secondary databases, namely, the KLD, the USPTO, the Fortunes reputational
rating and the Compustat databases. I use ordinary least squares methodology to observe
my rst hypothesis and negative binomial regression to observe my second hypothesis. The
results show that CSR is negatively related to the rmsnancial performance. This nding
is not suggesting that rms should not invest in CSR actions, but rather strengthens the
premises of a strategic assessment of CSR in order to provide tangible benets. I argue
that this negative relationship can be due to the fact that rms perceive CSR as an initial
cost in order to build a long term competitive advantage. Also, CSR actions may not be
directly related to the nancial benets of the rms but rather to other outcome measures,
for instance, the advertising e¤orts of the rms. Therefore to provide evidence on this
hypothesis we look at the relationship between CSR and the advertising e¤orts of the rms
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and nd that they are positively related to each other. This nding conrms our initial
idea about the ability of CSR to provide intangible benets for the rms.
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Chapter 1
Corporate Charitable Giving and
Advertising E¤orts
Abstract
The increasing public attention towards large corporations highlights the importance of stake-
holder management. Building a strong relationship with stakeholders is one of the main reasons why rms
engage in corporate social responsible (CSR) actions. CSR may act as an insurance against negative occur-
rences and protects the rm from negative public reactions. We aim to provide empirical evidence on this
conceptualization. In particular, we hypothesize that a rms contribution to charitable giving mitigates
unsuccessful advertising e¤orts that are often related to new product introduction. Moreover, we analyze
whether this relationship is more visible in industries that focus primarily on individual consumers.
Keywords: corporate philanthropy; moral capital; trademark
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1.1 Introduction
Large rms are often objects to public evaluation regarding their behavior and
actions with their stakeholder groups. For this reason a valuable corporate identity is
essential for the rms to ensure their existence in the long run. A strong identity can
nurture an overall good reputation, strengthen stakeholder relationships, and increase rm
performance (Fombrun, 1996). In order to achieve and maintain a strong rm identity,
rms often engage in corporate social activities.1
Previous theoretical (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994; Garriga and Melé 2004; Margo-
lis and Walsh, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002) and empirical research (Burke and Logsdon,
1996; Carroll et al., 1987; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Husted and Allen, 2007; Orlitzky et al.,
2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is exhaustive.
However, we nd ambiguous results. In particular, researchers found themselves in dis-
agreement on the aim and outcome of corporate social activities (Garriga and Melé, 2004;
Margolis and Walsh, 2003).
The inuential theoretical work by Godfrey (2005) tackles these issues and nds
that, strategic philanthropy, in general, creates a positive moral capital among stakeholder
groups. The moral capital itself acts as insurance-like protection for the rm to preserve
relational based intangible assets.
Following Godfreys theory, we argue in our study that consumers, when making
product choices, favour those rms which are investing in corporate philanthropic activities.
1A recent example is the large U.S. company, PepsiCo - This company invested 4.1 million dollars over
the past three years in the Waterpartners Water Credit program to help solve the worlds water and sanitary
problems as part of the Global Water Challenge -. The Global Water Challenge is a coalition of 24 leading
world companies, including Coca-Cola, Dow-Chemical and Procter & Gamble among others, contributing
to the same cause in collaboration with foundations, NGOs and research organizations (CECP, 2009).
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We aim to provide empirical evidence about this assumption and analyze the relationship
between corporate philanthropic activities and unsuccessful advertising e¤orts of rms that
are also often related to new product introduction. We hypothesize that those rms that
are highly involved in charitable giving - a well-known form of corporate philanthropy -
will experience less failure in their advertising e¤orts, represented by failedtrademarks.
Also, we hypothesize that this relationship is stronger for rms that focus on individual
consumers rather than for those rms which are primarily targeting business entities as
their focal consumers.
Our rm sample focuses on large public rms located in the U.S. We use the Kinder,
Lindenbergh and Domini (KLD) database to measure corporate philanthropy. The United
States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) serves us to measure failure in advertsing
e¤orts (represented by failed trademarks). We test our hypotheses using the negative bino-
mial regression model. Our results partially conrm our hypotheses. We nd evidence about
corporate philanthropic involvement reducing failure in advertising outcomes (trademarks)
of the rms. However, we nd no evidence regarding a stronger e¤ect for rms targeting
individual consumers.
In the following sections we rst give a theoretical orientation of our paper, then
we state our hypotheses and describe our methodology, and lastly we present our results
and conclude on our ndings.
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1.2 Theoretical background
1.2.1 Strategic philanthropy
In the prior literature on corporate social responsibility there exist an ongoing
debate about how CSR can contibute to the rms goals (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis and
Walsh, 2003). A general discussion among researchers point out the relationship between
CSR and rm performance. For instance, while Aupperle et al. (1985) found a negative rela-
tionship between social responsibility and nancial performance, Hillman and Keim (2001)
obtained mixed results on how stakeholder management and social issue participation a¤ect
shareholder value. A meta-analysis covering 52 studies by Orlitzky et al. (2003) concluded
an overall positive relationship between a rms social actions and nancial performance.
Researchers claim that the di¤erences in prior empirical ndings are due to the
lack of a well-dened theoretical grounding (Carroll, 1999; Garriga and Melé, 2004; Ull-
mann, 1985). Researchers apply a variety of theoretical views from di¤erent research elds,
such as, economics, psychology or strategic management to study the contribution of CSR
(Ullmann, 1985). Among these di¤erent theoretical approaches, a convergent view is the
perception of CSR as a strategic resource for the rm (Godfrey, 2005; Porter and Kramer,
2006). The idea of strategic philanthropy is based on the use of CSR actions as a strategic
resource and lies in the value creation ability of CSR with mutual benets, both, for the rm
and for the society. In our current study we apply this view as our theoretical background
to analyze the relationship between charitable giving and the failure in the advertising ef-
forts of the rms that is often related to new product introduction. Strategic philanthropy
was described in the inuential study of Porter and Kramer (2006). The authors argued
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that philanthropy becomes benetial for the rms at the point where the economic and
social benets converge. This indicates that those rms which engage in philanthropic ac-
tions motivated by a strategic purpose achieve better performance compared to those rms
which have purely altruistic motivations. In our case, we argue that rms which engage in
charitable giving - a common form of corporate philanthropy - and do this by aligning phil-
anthropic actions with rm objectives will experience intangible benets by a more e¤ective
advertising for their products. This benet will lie in the premise of improving stakeholder
relations through creating a positive moral capital (Godfrey, 2005). This positive moral
capital will then act as an insurance-like protection for the rms intangible assets and
mitigate negative valuations (Godfrey, 2005: 783)
This theoretical framing was developed by Godfrey (2005), who examined how
moral capital provides insurance for a rms relational capital. The author emphasized
that the moral capital creates benets and mitigates negative events unless the harm was
caused consciously or by negligence (2005: 788). For instance, consumers can be more
skeptical towards rms for which the motive to engage in philanthropic actions is perceived
as self-serving or the products are perceived as harmful to society.An example of the
latter is Altria Group which owns the brand Marlboro2. Altria Group possesses one of the
most elevated corporate philanthropic investments. In the past decade it donated over 1
billion dollars in cash, focusing mainly on health and disaster recovery issues. In the year
2004, Altria Group occupied third place in Business Weeks ranking of the top corporate
philanthropist rms. However, in the case of Altria Group, even with such large amounts
of donations, it is di¢ cult to build a positive rm image given their prole of producing a
2http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_48/b3961607.htm
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harmful product.
As we mentioned it before, unless the harm is perceived as being purposely caused
or caused by negligence, corporate philanthropy will strengthen a well-dened corporate
image. Consumers will associate good organizational values with rm products and in
turn philanthropy aligned with the business actions of the rms can support a successful
advertising.
Up to our knowledge the observation of an existing relationship between corporate
philanthropic actions and failedtrademarks as a proxy for unsuccessful advertising e¤orts
of the rms has not been addressed before.
1.2.2 Failed advertising e¤orts
However, researchers previously analyzed the intangible benets of corporate phil-
anthropy in di¤erent contexts, for instance, inuence in consumers purchase decisions (Lee
et al., 2009) or shaping a positive public evaluation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), our
study is novel in approaching this relationship by looking at failurein advertising e¤orts
measured by failed(abandoned) trademarks of the rms.
Prior literature that found a positive association between corporate philanthropy
and intangible benets on the rm level argue that those rms which are more involved
in charitable giving will earn higher public evaluation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). This
nding also strenghtens our previously mentioned theoretical view about how philanthropic
actions can create a moral capital for the rms by inuencing for instance consumer percep-
tions or shaping a positive rm image which in turn will have an inuence on consumption.
A study by Lee et al. (2009) also argued that corporate philanthropy is positively related
18
to the attitude of consumers and their purchase decisions about rm products produced by
rms investing in philanthropic actions.
When introducing a new product to the market rms have to take into account
many factors. Statistical demonstrations show that even though rms invest large amounts
of resources in developing a new product, one can observe a higher rate of new product
failure than new product success (Patrick, 1997). If failure occurs it can negatively a¤ect
rmsnancial performance, cause bad publicity or increase costs (Davidson and Worrell,
1992). Product failure can be due to several reasons given the complexity of the development
process at the organizational level. A successful product introduction depends on aspects
like meeting customer needs, technological preparedness and cooperation between intra-
organizational units (Dougherty, 1992) or the overall image of the rm. Therefore rms
need to align their product development processes with the overall rm strategy (Cooper
and Kleinschmidt, 1995). Corporate philanthropy can serve as a support mechanismin
representing rm values and help the rm to succed. We measure failure in the advertising
e¤orts of the rms with failed trademarks which is a proxy for advertising outcomeand
is often related to new products. Trademarks have emblematic and symbolic meanings and
consumers mostly associate rm products as well as the rm itself through given trademarks.
1.3 Hypotheses
As mentioned before, customers often evaluate rms from their actions and make
associations (Brown and Dacin, 1997) relying on public information. When consumers make
purchase decisions they expect rms to behave ethically and truthfully within their business
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environment and the society in general (Creyer and Ross, 1997). For this reason, rms aim
to signal a positive image towards consumers by investing in philanthropic actions (Godfrey,
2005; Peloza, 2005). Contributing to charities is one way for rms to represent socially re-
sponsible behavior. The basis for any such relationship between consumer and rm involves
trust. As Xia et al. (2004) argue, when consumers have no previous purchase experience
with the seller rm, they will base their trust on the rms image - which can be deducted
from public information of the rms goodwill -. A positive image of the rm will be a sig-
nal for initial trust which later, after repeated purchase converts to trustworthiness based
on knowledge and interpersonal relationships (2004: 5). Therefore, rms when investing
in charitable giving should assure to align these actions with their business initiatives in
order to create positive moral capital for the rm and support intangible assets, such as
stakeholder relationships and enhanced advertising.
Through this argument we claim that a rm with strong philanthropic presence
emphasizing charitable giving will signal positive and socially responsible behavior to stake-
holder groups, including consumers. When making purchase decisions consumers consider
all the available information about the rm and will prefer to purchase a product from a
responsible rm. Therefore, we hypothesize that increasing investment in charitable giv-
ing of the rm result in less failure in the advertising e¤orts which is often related to new
product introduction.
Hypothesis 1: A rms contribution to charitable giving will lower the failure of
advertising e¤orts.
Previously, researchers argued that rms should apply di¤erent marketing prac-
20
tices depending whether they are oriented towards the individual consumer or the industry
market (Webster, 1978). As Coviello and Brodie (2001) argued, rms producing for the
consumer market engage more in transaction marketing, using tools of advertising, sales
promotion, and public relations. Such marketing communications focusing on branding
and visual brand identity enhance consumer loyalty. In an inuential paper, Lev et al.
(2010) also argue that corporate philanthropy and the visibility of the rms goodwill is
better observed for those rms which sell their products to the individual consumers rather
than for those rms which sell their products to the industry market.
As a result, we hypothesize that rms which focus on individual consumers and
engage in philanthropic actions, namely charitable giving, will achieve better performance
in their advertising e¤orts often related to new products, than other rms. We argue that
individual consumers have a better visibility about rm philanthropic than the industry
market.
Hypothesis 2: The e¤ect of charitable giving on failure in advertising e¤orts is
moderated by individual consumer sensitivity.
1.4 Data and Methodology
1.4.1 Data description
We select our rm sample from the Standard and Poors (S&P) 500 list of the
largest U.S. rms for the year 2006. Our empirical analysis covers a nine year period, form
2000 to 2008. We identify 167 rms which stay consistent in our dataset throughout the nine
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years period and did not undergo bankruptcy, merger, or acquisition, and were concurrent
with the KLD3 database S&P 500 identication. Thus, in our nal sample we included the
selected 167 rms with 1503 rm year observations. We chose the S&P 500 rm list for our
study to capture the visibility of the largest charitable donations and to have at our disposal
the majority of the trademarks led in the United States. Our dataset is a balanced panel
dataset, where each rm is observed the same number of times.
1.4.2 Variables
Our dependent variable, Failure, is represented by a novel measure of failed
trademarks. Trademark failure occurs due to abandonment, improper licensing and gener-
icity as determined by the law.4 We consider in our recent study trademark failure due to
abandonment, which is dened as the discontinuous use of the trademark with no intent
to resume its use, as well as the non-use of the trademark for three consecutive years.5
The discontinuous use of a trademark is decided on the circumstances, and abandonment
is legally exercised with the aim of preventing the occupation of potentially useful marks.
We obtained our measure from the USPTO6 database containing 68,184 trademark failures.
The Lanham Act denes trademarks as Any word, name, symbol, or device, or any com-
bination thereof used by a person to distinguish his or her goods or services from those sold
by others.7
Nowadays we nd a growing number of studies employing trademarks as a measure
3KLD: Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research and Analytics Inc.
4Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1064; 15 U.S.C. 1058.
5http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/sher/domain/tm.htm
6USPTO: United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce.
7Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.,1127.
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of innovation or advertising e¤ort of the rms, using mainly the registration and ling date
of new trademarks as an indicators (Daizadeh, 2009; Flikkema et al., 2010; Fosfuri and
Giarratana, 2009; Krasnikov et al., 2009; Malmberg, 2005; Mendonca et al., 2004; Millot,
2009; Von Graevenitz, 2009).
Our explanatory variable is Charitable giving. Charitable giving represents the
visibility of the rms goodwill. We have collected data on charitable giving from the KLD
Research and Analytics Inc. The KLD STATS8 database covers among other o¢ cial rm
lists, the S&P 500 list of rms. This dataset separates positive and negative issues for
each company yearly from 1991 with a binary (1/0) yes/no value. KLD rates the social,
environmental, and governance performance of the companies using positive and negative
indicators (strengths and concerns). Companies are rated in seven major qualitative issue
areas: environment, community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, human
rights and product quality and safety.9 Data on the strengths of the community issue area
includes the categories: charitable, non-US charitable and innovative giving, support for
education and housing, volunteer programs, and other strengths. From these community
strength variables we specically selected the charitable giving10 variable as our measure
for philanthropic activity, represented by a binary 0/1 variable. Taking the value 1 if rm
has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to
charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving, and 0 otherwise.
8KLD STATS: Statistical Tool for the Analysis of Trends in Social and Environmental Performance.
9Information obtained from the o¢ cial KLD website, see References.
10KLD Stats data description of Charitable Giving: The company has consistently given over 1.5% of
trailing three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in
its giving.
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Control variables
We selected rm specic control variables from the Compustat database. We use
the variable return on equity (ROE) - the net income after tax divided by the share-
holder equity - to control for rm performance and rm reputation. As Fombrun and
Shanley (1990) mentioned in their work, corporate reputation is represented partially by
the nancial performance of the rm arising mainly from accounting data. The variable
R&D expenditure (R&D expenditure) represents all costs incurred during the year that
relate to the development of new advertising often related to new products or services. This
variable is important to control for the di¤erent levels of R&D investments among the rms.
The variable sales (Sales) represent the net sales of the rm, controlling for the size of the
rm. Advertising expenses (Advertising expense) stands for the cost of advertising media
(i.e., radio, television, and periodicals) and additional promotional costs of the rm. For
all the above mentioned variables we take the natural logarithm. To distinguish between
high and low individual consumer sensitive rms we introduce a dummy variable which we
multiply by our independent variable (Charitable giving*High sensitivity). It takes the
value 1 if the rm engaged in charitable donation (classied by its SIC code as consumer
oriented) and 0 otherwise. In addition, we included as a control variable the total number
of trademarks (Trademark Total # ) as obtained from the USPTO database. Finally, we
created two set of dummy variables: time dummy variables (Time dummy) for each year
from 2000 to 2008; and a high sensitivity dummy variable (High sens.dummy), which takes
value 1 if the rm is classied by its SIC code as consumer oriented and 0 otherwise.
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1.4.3 Model selection
Our general model is
Y  f(X;)
Where Y represents our count dependent variable (Failure), X our explanatory
variable (Charitable giving) and  is a vector of parameters. We use the negative binomial
regression model for our data analysis. We chose this model to capture the over dispersion
in our sample, having greater variance than the mean. Notice that the Poisson model would
be inappropriate holding the criterion of mean and variance equality (Greene, 2003). The
likelihood ratio test of our negative binomial model also conrms our model choice. In
addition, we applied the Hausman test on our data to decide whether to use random or
xed-e¤ects specication in our model. The results of the test led to the rejection of the
null hypothesis of uncorrelation between regressors and therefore we reject using random
e¤ects in our analysis (p-value less than 0.01%). We thus applied the xed-e¤ects negative
binomial regression model to test our two hypotheses. We conducted our empirical analysis
with the STATA 10 statistical software.
1.5 Results
In Tables 1 and 2 we represent the descriptive statistics of our variables and the
corresponding correlation matrix. Table 1 contains the number of observations, mean,
standard deviation, and maximum and minimum values for our key variables. Observe
that an average rm in our sample owns 32 trademarks. Furthermore, those failures for an
average rm, which we represent by failed trademarks, involve nearly 15 trademarks.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observation Mean S.D. Min Max
Failure 1503 14.74 45.35 0 674
Charitable giving 1503 0.07 0.26 0 1
Charitable giving*High sensitivity dummy 1503 0.04 0.21 0 1
High sensitivity dummy 1503 0.43 0.49 0 1
R&D expenditure 1503 4.82 1.88 0 7.09
Advertising expenses 1503 2.35 2.65 0 6.94
Total trademark # 1503 31.82 77.72 0 1157
Sales 1503 15.98 1.29 11.94 19.86
ROE 1503 18.38 33.93 -179.37 473.08
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Variab les 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 .
1 .Failure 1
2.Charitab le g iv . 0 .1377 1
3.Char. g iv .*H igh sens. d . 0 .2063 0.7292 1
4.H igh sens. dummy 0.2011 0.0704 0.2422 1
5.R&D exp. 0 .1061 -0.0891 -0 .1753 -0 .4019 1
6.Adv. exp . 0 .2100 0.0781 0.1994 0.3127 -0 .2523 1
7.Total trademark # 0.9324 0.1446 0.2142 0.2050 0.0946 -0.1773 1
8.Sales 0 .1016 0.1582 0.1564 0.1435 -0 .0371 0.1816 0.1438 1
9.ROE 0.0486 -0 .0356 -0 .0273 0.1291 -0 .0393 0.1328 0.0510 0.0830 1
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In Table 3 we show the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 analyzes
the relationship between charitable giving and failure in advertising e¤orts of the rms. We
applied a xed e¤ects negative binomial regression model to test this hypothesis. Our results
are statistically signicant showing a strong negative relationship between our dependent
and explanatory variable thus, conrming Hypothesis 1. Roughly speaking, the more a rm
invests in charitable giving the less failure it will su¤er as consumers will perceive the rm
as truthful and fair. In our model we included our control variable Advertising expense
which shows a negative sign but is statistically insignicant. An interesting observation is
our second control variable, R&D expenditure, which is statistically signicant and positive
in sign.
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the individual/industrial consumer categories. To identify
these two categories we followed the industry classication of the SIC Manual (1972), which
is usually considered by researchers for such categorization. For instance, Ehrlich and Fisher
(1982) have applied this classication in order to distinguish between consumer/producer
oriented manufacturing industries.
To test our second hypothesis, we newly conducted a xed e¤ects negative bino-
mial regression, observing the inuence of charitable giving on product failure taking into
account the target consumers of the rm, depending whether it is an individual consumer
or a business-to-business relationship. We measure high individual consumer sensitivity
with a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the rm is individual consumer oriented and is
specied according to the SIC classication as a consumer oriented rm; whereas it takes
the value 0 if the rm is classied as industrial consumer oriented. We multiply our dummy
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variable for high individual consumer sensitivity (High sensitivity) by our independent vari-
able Charitable giving to test Hypothesis 2. We conducted a T-test on the Beta coe¢ cients
of the two groups of high and low consumer sensitive rms, where we obtained conrmation
about the distinction between these groups (Prob > chi2 = 0.0393).
Table 3: Estimation results of the impact of charitable giving of the rms on product failure
[Failure] (1) (2) (3) (4)
Charitable Giving  0:28
(0:11)
 0:61
(0:19)
 0:45
(0:09)
 0:47
(0:17)
Charitable Giving* High Sens. Dummy 0:54
(0:23)
0:08
(0:20)
High Sensitivity Dummy 0:39
(0:11)
0:70
(0:14)
R&D Expenditure 0:10
(0:03)
0:16
(0:03)
Advertising Expense  0:01
(0:02)
 0:04
(0:02)
Total Trademark # 0:004
(0:00)
0:004
(0:00)
Sales 0:10
(0:04)
0:10
(0:04)
ROE 0:28
(0:07)
0:26
(0:07)
Time Dummies Yes Yes
Constant 0:16
(0:06)
 0:02
(0:08)
 1:02
(0:70)
 1:62
(0:71)
Observations 1503 1503
Number of Firms 167 167
Chi2 6.19 26.23 964.89 1064.46
Log Likelihood -3415.81 -3404.48 -3186.75 -3173.36
Note: Standard errors in pharenthesis. Signicance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The results do not support our second hypothesis, showing no signicance for a
stronger relationship of high individual consumer sensitive rms associated with stronger
visibility of rm identity through charitable contribution and the failure of advertising ef-
forts of the rms. Previous literature (Avlonitis and Gounaris, 1997; Kotler and Armstrong,
2004) emphasized a more rened and developed marketing orientation for individual con-
sumer oriented rms, whereas identied a strongly sales oriented relationship among indus-
trial consumers and their seller rms. The researchers referred to high individual consumer
sensitive rms as being more sensitive to the implementation of changes in consumer needs
and market conditions inrm products and strategic actions (Avlonitis and Gounaris, 1997).
However in our current study we did not nd support for these previous observations.
1.6 Conclusion
To achieve social recognition and enhance a positive corporate image, rms in-
creasingly focus on di¤erent stakeholder groups and tend to create a closer relationship
with them. Investing in corporate philanthropy, which is considered to be an important
part of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1997), may increase a positive public eval-
uation and the trustworthiness of rms among its stakeholders. The theoretical work by
Godfrey (2005) highlights moral capital building as a mechanism for obtaining positive pub-
lic evaluation through corporate philanthropic actions. Godfrey argues that moral capital
building creates protection for the rms intangible assets such as stakeholder relations and
accordingly increases shareholder wealth.
In our empirical study we focus on one particular stakeholder group, the con-
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sumers. We aim to prove that rms investing in corporate philanthropic action, namely,
charitable giving, positively a¤ects the consumersperception about the rm and thereby
prevents failures in advertising e¤orts often related to new product intrdocution. First, we
hypothesize that rms su¤er less failure in their advertising e¤orts which are often related
to new product introduction and measured by abandoned trademarks, if they invest in char-
itable giving. Second, we hypothesize that this relationship will be more visible for rms
focusing on individual consumers.
Our novel measure of failure in advertising e¤orts is obtained from trademark data
from the USPTO database. Our results conrm our rst hypothesis, where we found that
rms that engage in charitable giving su¤er less failure in their advertising e¤orts. However,
our results do not support our second hypothesis, implying a more signicant e¤ect for high
individual consumer sensitive rms.
This study states a general conclusion of consumer response to rm actions, where
a positive action will be rewarded generating reciprocal stakeholder-rm benets. In our
future research we intend to focus on the economic benets of charitable giving and on
nding further evidence of the tangible benets of corporate philanthropy.
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Chapter 2
Institutional Pressures and Firms
CSR Actions: A Geographical
Approach
Abstract
We study the relationship between internal and external stakeholder pressures and rm CSR
actions. We distinguish two types of CSR actions, altruistic and innovative CSR actions. We argue that
rms respond to stakeholder pressures taking into account specic characteristics, such as the visibility, the
cost sturcture and the time constraints of the two CSR action types. We nd that internal and local external
stakeholder pressures - employees or local NGOs - a¤ect positively innovative CSR actions. We also nd a
positvie relationship between external stakeholder pressures - local NGOs and global human right concerns
- and altruistic CSR actions.
Keywords: institutional, pressure, CSR, geographic distance, visibility, stakeholder.
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2.1 Introduction
Previous research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is extensive (Carroll et
al., 1987, Burke and Logsdon, 1996; Waddock and Graves 1997; Hillman and Keim 2001;
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Garriga and Melé 2004; Porter and Kramer,
2002; Donaldson and Dunfee 1994). Scholars often analyze the motivations (Garriga and
Melé 2004; Orlitzky et al., 2003) and the consequences (Lev et al., 2010; Waddock and
Graves, 1997) of CSR actions. It is well known from previous research that rm motivations
to initiate CSR actions can originate from the increased societal requirements of institutional
actors and stakeholder groups (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Marquis et al., 2007). Such
increased attention from the society often puts rms in the center of attention. Firms,
in order to respond to these claims, invest in corporate social responsibility because CSR
actions provide legitimacy to the rm and allow them to continue their existence.
The novelty in our study is that we introduce a geographical dimension to the
notion of institutional pressures. We argue that geographical distance of institutional pres-
sures matters for rms in choosing their CSR action strategies. To study this setting is
relevant rst because the stakeholder groups of the rms and therefore institutional pres-
sures are highly diverse (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and second because
there are fundamental di¤erences in the basic characteristics visibility, cost structure and
time constraints - of CSR actions which the rm has to take into account in order to re-
spond to institutional pressures correctly (Burke and Logsdon, 1996; Paul and Siegel, 2006).
Stakeholder groups are any group of individuals that have a claim on or a stake in a rm
(Freeman, 1984) and are a¤ected by the rmsactions. Stakeholder groups can assert in-
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stitutional pressure on rms when they perceive rm actions as unethical or irresponsible.
These stakeholder groups are geographically distant from each other and have distinct con-
cerns about the rm. Therefore we distinguish internal and external stakeholder groups
of the rm (Zucker, 1987). We make this categorization in order to capture the di¤erent
nature of institutional pressures which a¤ects rm CSR actions. On one hand we measure
internal institutional pressure by taking into account the stakeholder pressure coming from
employees. On the other hand we make two subcategories of external institutional pres-
sures, namely, local and global stakeholder pressures that a¤ect rm CSR actions. With
local institutional pressures we measure stakeholder pressures coming from local NGOs and
with human rights concerns we analyze global stakeholder pressures.
We connect internal and external institutional pressures to CSR actions. We argue
that in our setting rms motivation to invest in CSR actions is originated from an internal
or external institutional pressure (Scott, 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) so that rms
develop a CSR strategy in order to respond to them. The complexity of CSR actions is well
known from the previous CSR literature (Carroll et al., 1987; Waddock and Graves 1997),
for instance Burke and Logsdon (1996) studied previously the complexity of CSR actions
and identied ve dimensions, which are: centrality, specicity, proactivity, voluntarism
and visibility of the actions. We argue that when rms are facing institutional pressure,
they have to take into account specic characteristics of CSR actions to respond adequately.
We believe that the visibility, the cost structure and the time constraints of CSR actions
will be key characteristics that the rms have to evaluate when responding to institutional
pressures. We separate two types of CSR actions, altruistic and innovative CSR actions.
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We separate these two types as they have clearly distinguishable values for the rm and
for the stakeholder groups regarding their previously mentioned characteristics - we further
discuss these arguments in the following sections of the paper -.
This is important to study because rms will have a better understanding about the
di¤erent stakeholder pressures they may face and will be able to set them in a geographical
perspective when making investment decisions about CSR actions in order to respond to
them. With this framework rms will be able to align their CSR actions with their business
actions to gain legitimacy and improve their competitive advantage.
As we mentioned before, to connect internal and external stakeholder pressures
and CSR actions we build on institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Friedland and Alford, 1991). We hypothesize that rms use
altruistic CSR actions as a response to institutional pressures when the pressure is coming
from external - local and global  stakeholder groups. We also hypothesize that rms
use innovative CSR actions as a response to institutional pressures when it comes either
from internal or from local external stakeholder groups. To test these relationships we
use a sample of 151 rms from the S&P 500 rms list and apply the seemingly unrelated
regression equations model by Zellner (1962). Our results conrm that geographical distance
of institutional pressures matter and will inuence CSR actions of the rms by reacting to
internal and external pressures with either altruistic or innovative CSR actions depending
on the characteristics of each.
The remaining of this paper is as follows. In Sections 2 we review the theoretical
literature. In Section 3 we present and discuss our hypotheses. In Section 4 and 5 we
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explain our methodology and the results of the empirical analysis and lastly (Section 6) we
conclude.
2.2 Theoretical background
2.2.1 Institutional theory
In our study we build on institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fried-
land and Alford, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 1983; North, 1990) to study the relationship
between stakeholder pressures and their e¤ects on CSR actions. DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
dene the new institutionalism and the process of institutional isomorphism. In this process
when a new sector emerges, the organizations and the environment mutually shape each
other and create an established legal framework. With time, when new organizations enter
in the same sector, they adapt to their environment and to the existing legal requisites.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic
processes namely, coercive, mimetic, and normative processes. Firms in order to gain legiti-
macy in their institutional environment apply these isomorphic processes arising either from
a higher authority (coercive), uncertainty (mimetic) or from the professional environment
(normative). Stakeholders, as institutional actors, can play an important role in forming
the insitutional environment of businesses (e.g. social movements). Because stakeholder
groups are diverse, their interests and focus of pressure can a¤ect rms in di¤erent ways
and degrees to which rms react by choosing their best response (altruistic or innovative
CSR).
Delmas and To¤el (2008), for instance, show that rms respond to institutional
42
pressures coming from market and non-market constituencies di¤erently. In a more recent
paper by the same authors, Delmas and To¤el (2011) argue that rms, although facing
common institutional pressures, adopt di¤erent environmental practices due to organiza-
tional characteristics. Also, Chiu and Sharfman (2011) analyze that institutional pressures
are more likely to have higher levels for those rms that are more visible toward institu-
tional actors. These ndings reinforce our view about the existing di¤erences in stakeholder
pressures and the corresponding rm responses. In our current study we analyze how stake-
holder pressures can di¤er by taking into account the geography of the pressures. We
separate internal -, local external-, and global external stakeholder pressures. In this sense,
rms facing stakeholder pressures coming from these distinct geographical distances will
respond by investing either in altruistic or in innovative CSR actions, depending on the
type of pressure and rm characteristics. By these actions rms will gain legitimacy that
provides them with a licence for a long-term existence. Moreover, rms will be able to
align better the needs of di¤erent stakeholder groups with the rms objectives.
In the following subsection we explain more in detail the geographical aspect of
institutional pressures.
2.2.2 Geographical approach of instituional pressure
Prior literature on stakeholder management analyzed the e¤ects of stakeholder
pressures on rm actions (Marquis et al., 2007). As we mentioned before, in our current
study we categorize stakeholder pressures regarding their geographical distance to the rm.
We identify internal, local external, and global external stakeholder pressures and we analyze
how they a¤ect rm CSR actions.
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Stakeholder groups were dened by Freeman (1984) as any group of individuals
that are inuenced by or are inuencing the operations of the rms. Freeman (1984) also
refered to an internal and external orientation of stakeholder groups with regard to the
position of the rms (Freeman, 1984). We measure internal stakeholder groups by em-
ployee concerns; and external stakeholder pressures by local and global pressures, coming
accordingly from local NGOs and global human rights concerns.
Internal stakeholder pressures di¤er from external stakeholder pressures in their
capabilities to inuence rm actions. Internal stakeholder groups are important because
of their commitment to the rm and their ability to communicate a shared understanding
about an optimal alignment of CSR and business actions inside the rm (Porter and Kramer,
2006). A study by Sarkis et al. (2010) analyzed internal and external stakeholder pressures
highlighting internal stakeholder concerns as a key factor to the adoption of sustainable
rm practices in the rm. We argue that internal stakeholders, namely, employees will
favor CSR actions that are related to the long-term advantage of the rms and that gives
a good strategic positioning among the rmscompetitors.
External stakeholder groups have an inuence on the public audience and can
shape a public opinion about the rm. Marquis et al. (2007) studied how local external
pressures can a¤ect rm CSR actions. The authors highlight isomorphic pressures in lo-
cal communities that form CSR actions. They mention cultural cognitive, regulative and
relational forces that primarily inuence rm CSR actions.We argue that because of their
external inuence, local NGOs and global human rights concerns, are important external
stakeholder pressures and given their geographical distance, they have to be responded by
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the rms di¤erently than compared to internal stakeholder pressures.
We study this phenomenon of external and internal stakeholder pressures and
CSR actions because we expect great variation between the two given that stakeholder
groups di¤er in their claims towards the rms. We argue that the geography of stakeholder
pressures are an important factor when making rm decisions about CSR actions (altruistic
and innovative) because rms will take into account these characteristics and evaluate CSR
actions by their visbility, cost structure and time constraints, in order to respond adequately.
We will explain this framework more in detail in the following subsection.
2.2.3 CSR and institutional theory
As we discussed it previously institutional theory is often applied in CSR research
(Campbell, 2007; Desai, 2011; Matten and Moon, 2008). Previous studies use institutional
theory in di¤erent settings related to corporate social responsibility. We nd studies that
analyze CSR practices and focus on institutional conditions (Campbell, 2007; Matten and
Moon, 2008); other researchers study international institutional practices in relation with
CSR (Husted and Allen, 2006; Golob and Bartlett, 2007; Doh and Guay, 2006; Yin and
Zhang, 2012); or focus on a particular type of institutional processes (coercive, mimetic, or
normative) to nd a common pattern in rm CSR actions (Berrone et al., 2009; Marquis
et al., 2007). Currently, various typologies exist of CSR actions in the corporate social
responsibility literature (Husted & de Jesus Salazar, 2006; Windsor, 2006). For instance,
Husted and de Jesus Salazar (2006) analyze CSR types of altruism, coerced egoism and
strategy. Porter and Kramer (2006) distinguish general social issues, responsive CSR and
strategic CSR that inuence rms performance in a competitive environment. Lantos
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(2001) also provides a framework of ethical, altruistic and strategic CSR actions of the
rms. Whereas Halme and Laurila (2009) typify CSR actions in an action-based typology
and separate: philanthropic, integrative and innovative.
As we mentioned it earlier in our study we di¤erentiate between two types of
CSR actions: altruistic and innovative CSR actions. We describe altruistic CSR actions as
philanthropic actions of the rms, which have no nancial benets for the rm and usually
take the form of cash or non-cash rm donations, for example charitable giving. On the
other hand we describe innovative CSR actions as any non-purely altruistic CSR actions
of the rms. We include policy adoptions, R&D investments in responsible innovation and
new responsible product and project developments of the rm.
We explain our typology taking into account three characteristics of the actions
to the conformity to institutional pressures the visibility, the cost structure and the time
constraints. The visibility of the CSR actions towards the internal and external stakeholder
groups is an important characteristic of value creation for the rms (Burke and Logsdon,
1996; Chiu and Sharfman, 2011). We use the denition of CSR visibility by Burke and
Logsdon (1996), which states that: Visibility denotes both the observability of a business
activity and the rms ability to gain recognition from internal and external stakeholders
(1996: 499). It is important to di¤erentiate between the visibility of altruistic and in-
novative CSR actions of the rms on internal and external levels. Altruistic actions are
generally more visible for external stakeholder groups whereas innovative actions are more
visible for internal and local external stakeholder groups. The investment/cost structure
is also important when we di¤erentiate between the two types of CSR actions. If we com-
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pare altruistic and innovative CSR actions we can see clearly the di¤erences in their cost
structures. Altruistic CSR actions are charitable giving actions in form of cash and product
donations, a once or periodically applied (e.g. yearly) cost for the rm of a certain amount,
whereas innovative CSR actions are long term policy adoptions or R&D investments in new
responsible product and project developments which involves more uncertainty about the
amount invested and for a continuous period of time. We argue that altruistic CSR actions
therefore will represent a lower cost than compared to innovative CSR actions of the rm.
Firms choose actions when facing institutional pressure that guarantee them the highest
conformity at lower cost. The time constraints of the CSR actions is also an important
characteristic when facing institutional pressure as rms may need to take into account a
certain time frame. When the response to the pressure is urgent rms have to choose a CSR
action that has the appropriate characteristic. Altruistic actions e.g. charitable giving,
cash or product donations - have the ability to serve as an adequate response when the
rms are facing urgent institutional pressures, whereas innovative CSR actions - e. g. new
responsible product or process developments - are more suitable for a long term in-depth
response.
Table 1. CSR action framework
Altruistic CSR Innovative CSR
Visbility (to public audience) High Low
Cost structure One-time; Periodical Continuous
Time constraints Rapid Moderate
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2.3 Hypotheses
Our rst hypothesis states that when institutional pressures comes from internal
stakeholder group of the rm, namely, employees, then innovative CSR actions will be
emphasized over altruistic CSR actions. We base our arguments on our previously discussed
relationship between stakeholder pressures and CSR actions (Marquis et al., 2007). We
argue that the relationship of internal institutional pressures and altruistic and innovative
CSR actions lie on three characteristics: the visibility, the cost structure and the time
constraints of the CSR actions. The visibility of CSR actions towards internal stakeholder
groups of the rm is more emphasized by innovative CSR actions because employees have
insider information and understand better the underlying mechanisms of connecting CSR
and business actions. If we look at the cost structure of CSR actions we can say that
innovative CSR actions require more resources than compared to altruistic CSR actions
as usually they refer to new responsible product or process developments. For this reason
innovative CSR actions will be valued more by internal stakeholder groups as these actions
will be benecial not only for the society but also for the rm. Also, as the rm involves
employees in innovative CSR projects it will enhance employee satisfaction of being part
of a responsible rm. As mentioned previously, time constraints are also an important
characteristics when rms are responding to institutional pressures. Innovative actions, as
we have argued, usually take longer time to develop as altruistic actions. In the case of
internal institutional pressure, employees will value the e¤orts that the rm takes to enhance
innovative CSR actions and will also value the outcome of these actions as they are more
patient, less sensitive to time constraints. Therefore with these arguments we state that
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the employees of the rm will favor innovative CSR actions over altruistic CSR actions. We
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Firms facing institutional pressure coming from internal stakeholder
group, namely, from employees will emphasize more innovative CSR actions then altruistic
CSR actions.
In our second hypotheses we analyze how external local stakeholder pressures
coming from local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) a¤ect rm CSR actions. We
measure local NGOs by the number of NGOs in the same state where the rmsheadquarters
are located divided by the population of all NGOs in our sample. We base our arguments on
our previous discussion of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and stakeholder
pressure coming from the stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984) of the rms. When facing
pressures from local NGOs rms have to take into account both types of CSR actions to
respond adequately, because we argue that local NGOs can pressure rms and require a
quick response, an urgent answer to its concerns, but the pressure can also be persistent
as being geographically close and can require long term collaboration. In this case rms
have to consider both, altruisitc and innovative CSR actions at the same time to respond to
local NGO pressures. Altruistic CSR actions are more visible towards external groups and
provide a quick answer, however innovative CSR actions are less visible and take a longer
time to respond. Given the fact that local NGOs can assert pressure on the rm either
temporary or persistent because of their grographical proximity rms respond can respond
with a short or a long-term solution. Therefore, in this case, rms will equally care about
the altruistic and innovative CSR actions. We hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 2: Firms facing institutional pressure coming from local external stake-
holder groups, namely, from local NGOs will emphasize both altruistic CSR actions and
innovative CSR actions.
In our third hypotheses we focus on the relationship between global external insti-
tutional pressures and the CSR actions of the rms. Global external institutional pressures
are measured by human rights concerns. We argue that altruistic CSR actions will be
more emphasized by rms when facing external global institutional pressures. We base
our argument on the characteristics of altruistic and innovative CSR actions. The visi-
bility of altruistic CSR actions in this case will be even more important than previously
because of the articulated geographical distance between the pressure and the rms main
location. Firms will shift from investing in innovative CSR actions to investing in altruistic
CSR actions in order to handle the concerns coming from a geographically distant location.
Firms respond with altruistic CSR actions to these distant pressures because it is more time
e¢ cient, requires less resources and is highly visible for the public. Global stakeholder pres-
sures compared to internal or local pressures are less likely to be persistent. For this reason
we state that rms will favor altruistic actions to innovative CSR actions when receiving
global stakeholder pressures. We hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: Firms facing institutional pressure coming from external global
stakeholder groups, namely, from human rights concerns will emphasize more altruistic
CSR actions and decrease innovative CSR actions.
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2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Model description
In this section we describe our dataset and the methodology for our empirical
analysis. Our dataset is a balanced panel dataset covering a nine year period, from 2000 to
2008. We have 151 rms in our dataset with 1208 rm year observations from the Standard
and Poors 500 (S&P 500) list of the ve hundred best performing rms in the United
States. We use the S&P 500 list of rms in order to capture the importance of institutional
pressure and CSR actions accurately as the majority of these concerns and the related CSR
actions are present in large companies. Our nal sample contains 151 rms because during
our nine year period many rms from the 500 list went through merger and acquisition or
faced bankruptcy. Moreover, our main concern was the missing data for a large set of the
companies because of using three di¤erent databases over a nine year period (KLD STATS
database, COMPUTAT and WANGO). For these reasons we created our nal sample of
151 rms from the originally S&P 500 rms sample. Our sample has some potential biases
given that we use only large and public rms which might a¤ect the generalizability of our
results.
To analyze the relationship between institutional pressures and CSR actions we
use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) equations model to test our hypotheses:
Y i = Xii+ "i i = 1; : : : ;M
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The SUR model was intruded by Zellner (1962) and used widely in the elds of
nance and economics. This model is useful for our analysis beause it states that if a system
of equations are related by their error-terms which means that the variance-covariance
matrix used is non-diagonal or the o¤-diagonal terms are not zero. Also the model will be
e¢ cient if the independent variables are not the same through the di¤erent equations in the
system.
We use the Breusch- Pagan test to see whether the error terms of the equations
are related or not. The test conrms (P=0.000) that the two equations are related in their
error-terms; therefore, it is correct to use the SUR model.
2.4.2 Variable description
Dependent variables
Our two dependent variables are Altruistic CSRactions and Innovative CSR
actions. We construct both of our variables from the KLD Stats database. In the KLD
database there are seven major issue areas and 80 indicators, all indicators are binary 0/1
constructs. All seven issue areas are divided in two parts, strengths and concerns.
Altruistic CSRactions as we previously dened, refers to charitable giving of the
rms; using rm resources for altruistic purposes, usually cash or non-cash donations. We
construct our variable by using the strengths indicators from the Communityissue area
of the KLD database. We use all the strengths indicators in the Community issue area,
which are: generous giving, innovative giving, support for education, support for housing,
volunteer programs and other community strengths. We add these six originally binary
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indicators to create our measure.
Innovative CSRactions as also dened previously, refer to responsible product
or process developments and policy adoptions of the rms. We construct this variable by
using strength indicators from the Productand Environmentalissue areas of the KLD
database. We use the following selected strengths indicators: environmental products and
services, R&D/ Innovation in responsible product developments, benets to economically
disadvantaged through products and other product strengths. We add these four originally
binary indicators to create our measure.
Independent variables
Our independent variables are Employee pressure, NGO pressure and Hu-
man rights concerns. We build the variables, Employee pressure and Human rights
concerns, from the KLD Stats database. As we mentioned it before the KLD database
has seven major issue areas and 80 binary indicators divided into two parts, strengths and
concerns. To build our independent variables Employee pressureand Human rights con-
cerns. we use in each case the concerns indicators from the corresponding issue areas. To
build our NGO pressurewe used our own dataset created from the WANGO database
http://www.wango.org/ of worldwide NGOs.
Employee pressureis our variable to measure internal institutional pressure. We
constructed this variable from the Employee relationsissue area and using the concerns
indicators: union relations, health and safety concerns, workforce reduction, retirement
benet concerns and other employee concern variables. We again add these ve binary
indicators to obtain our variable.
53
NGO pressure is our variable to measure local external institutional pressures.
We constructed this variable by the number of NGOs in the same state where the rms
have their headquarters (NGO pressure = # of NGOs in a state/ population of NGOs). We
took the data from the world association of non-governmental organizations (WANGO). In
our dataset we identied in total 21.503 NGOs. NGOs are dened by The World Bank as:
"Private organizations that pursue activities to relieve su¤ering, promote the interests of
the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community
development." NGOs act independently from any governmental or political party. NGOs
often exercise pressure on rms in order to make them behave responsible. An example is
the US religious organization, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), which
targets rms such as ExxonMobil, Wal-Mart and Chevron with shareholder activism in
order to achieve responsible rm behavior. Also NGOs often pressure rms with permanent
media attention raising neglected rm responsibility issues. Two famous examples are the
cases of Reebok and British Petroleum (Yu, 2008; The Economist article, 20101 ). Both
rms received strong media attention from NGOs because of irresponsible rm behavior in
the past years. In our current study we do not distinguish among NGO pressure types as
it is not part of our focus in the current paper.
Human rights concerns is our variable to measure external global institutional
pressures. We constructed this variable from the Human rights issue area and using
the concerns indicators: South Africa, Northern Ireland, Burma, Mexico, labor rights,
indigenous peoples relations and other concerns . We again add these ve binary indicators
to obtain our variable. Human rights concerns are important as they can negatively a¤ect
1http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/07/bps_future
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rm reputation and have a global media coverage which can result very harmful for the
rm. We recall the example of Nike Inc., an American apparel company, which had various
pressures from di¤erent stakeholder groups (e.g. consumers, NGOs, activists) concerned
about their so called sweatshop processes in Asian countries where their manufacturing
installations are located (Locke, 2002).
We use a one year lag of our independent variables to capture previous institutional
pressures (t-1) relationship to CSR actions (t).
Control variables
In addition, we use the following control variables: State Population2, State
Land area3, Sales, Employees, ROA, R&D expenses, Advertising expensesand
Time dummy variables. The variables State Population and State Land area are
obtained from the United States Census Bureau4. The variables Sales, Employees,
R&D expenses, Advertising expenses and ROA are obtained from the COMPUS-
TAT database. For the variables Sales, Employees, Advertising expensesand R&D
expenseswe take the natural logarithm. The variable Salesrepresents the annual sales
of the rms in our sample and the variable Employeesrepresents the number of employ-
ees of the rms in our sample; both control for rm size. The variable ROAdenotes the
annual return-on-assets (net income/total assets) of the rms. The Advertising expenses
variable stands for the cost of advertising media (i.e., radio, television, and periodicals)
and additional promotional costs of the rm. The R&D expensesvariable represents all
2From the year 2010, in million.
3From the year 2010, in square miles.
4http://www.census.gov, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html
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costs incurred during the year that relate to the development of new products or services;
this variable is important to control for the di¤erent levels of R&D investments among the
rms. Also, we use time dummy variables given the panel nature of our dataset - it takes
the value 0 or 1 depending on the given year-. We take a one year lag (t-1) of our control
variables in our regression analysis.
2.5 Results
In Table 2 we show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of our
variables.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Variab les M ean S.D . 1. 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10.
1 .A ltru istic CSR act. .608 .912 1
2.Innovative CSR act. .214 .436 0.158 1
3.Employee Pressure .709 .831 0.098 0.083 1
4.NGO pressure .082 .093 0.147 -0 .025 -0 .106 1
5.Human rights cons. .240 .477 0.239 -0 .025 0.235 0.009 1
6.State p opulation 1.61e+07 1.21e+07 0.064 -0 .078 -0 .079 0.846 0.049 1
7.State land area 78334.08 72027.28 0.031 -0 .083 -0 .013 0.441 0.171 0.761 1
8.ROA 63.15 88.18 0.090 0.028 -0 .112 -0 .021 0.036 0.002 0.048 1
9.Sales (log) 6.97 .556 0.389 0.112 0.266 -0 .139 0.402 -0 .108 0.023 0.119 1
10.Employees (log) 4.52 .534 0.331 0.122 0.255 -0 .271 0.338 -0 .276 -0 .128 0.090 0.837 1
56
The results of our regression analysis are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.
Table 3: Estimation results of the impact of institutional pressures on altruistic and innovative
CSR actions.
Altru istic CSR actions A ltru istic CSR actions Innovative CSR actions Innovative CSR actions
Employee pressure 0.0157 0.0381**
(0.0314) (0 .0162)
NGO pressure 4.205*** 0.822***
(0.588) (0 .308)
Human rights concerns 0.231*** -0 .0773***
(0.0550) (0 .0292)
State p opulation 2.00e-08*** -1 .89e-08*** 4.46e-10 -7 .24e-09**
(3.23e-09) (6 .32e-09) (1 .66e-09) (3 .32e-09)
State land area -1 .57e-06*** 6.52e-07 -4 .84e-07* 1.11e-07
(5.24e-07) (6 .36e-07) (2 .69e-07) (3 .33e-07)
ROA 0.000585** 0.000628**
(0.000283) 0.000279)
Employees (log) 0.652*** 0.570*** 0.0812* 0.0742
(0.0478) (0 .0505) (0 .0454) (0 .0453)
Sales (log) 0.0146 0.0339
(0.0427) (0 .0431)
T im e dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2 .551*** -2 .183*** -0.226 -0 .337*
(0.239) (0 .242) (0 .174) (0 .183)
R -squared 0.149 0.199 0.022 0.036
N 1208 1208 1208 1208
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Estimation results of the impact of institutional pressures on altruistic and innovative
CSR action (robust).
Altru istic CSR actions A ltru istic CSR actions Innovative CSR actions Innovative CSR actions
Employee pressure -0 .0347 0.164**
(0.161) (0 .0817)
Local community pressure 0.741*** 0.254*
(0.281) (0 .153)
Human rights concerns 1.155*** -0 .395***
(0.286) (0 .148)
State p opulation 2.00e-08*** 2.01e-08*** 4.46e-10 4.33e-10
(3.23e-09) (3 .19e-09) (1 .66e-09) (1 .65e-09)
State land area -1 .57e-06*** -2 .00e-06*** -4 .84e-07* -3 .98e-07
(5.24e-07) (5 .26e-07) (2 .69e-07) (2 .72e-07)
ROA 0.000585** 0.000574**
(0.000283) (0.000281)
Employees (log) 0.652*** 0.544*** 0.0812* 0.0858*
(0.0478) (0.0521) (0 .0454) (0 .0461)
Sales (log) 0.0146 0.0101
(0.0427) (0 .0456)
T im e dumm ies Yes No Yes No
Constant -2 .551*** -2 .169*** -0 .226 -0 .239
(0.239) (0.245) (0 .174) (0 .188)
R -squared 0.149 0.169 0.022 0.031
N 1208 1208 1208 1208
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results conrm our hypothesis and show that altruistic CSR actions are more
visible and more valued by external stakeholder groups. Therefore we nd a positive and
signicant relationship between altruistic CSR actions and external institutional pressures,
both on local and global levels (H2; H3). We also argue that these results conrm the
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relationship between internal employee pressure and altruistic actions which hypothesized
no benets for employees. Therefore, employees do not consider altruistic actions as a
proper answer to internal stakeholder concerns.
Regarding rm innovative CSR actions we also nd results conrming our hy-
potheses. We nd that internal employee pressures and external local NGO pressures have
a positive and signicant relationship to the innovative CSR actions of the rm (H1). We
also nd conrmation about that global external institutional pressure, which we measure
by human rights concerns, is negatively related to the rmsinnovative CSR actions (H3).
We interpret these results as the following. We found that internal employee pres-
sures and local external NGO pressures are positively related to the innovative CSR actions
of the rm. This positive relationship is explained by the focus of the rm on the well-being
and satisfaction of these particular stakeholder groups when investing in innovation. For
instance employees can benet from investments in R&D and in the development of new
responsible product or operating systems in the rm, because by adapting to regulations
and policies, the rm will pay more attention to employee relations and hereby increase
their satisfaction at the workplace. The same applies to the local stakeholder groups. Also,
we found that external global institutional pressures Human rights concerns - are relevant
when the rm behaves unethical or harms its environment. If this is the case, the image
of the rm will su¤er from such negative events and the rm will use a CSR type that is
not related to any nancial benet but to a great visibility for external stakeholders of the
rm. The rm will engage in purely altruistic actions to recover the good image. The rms
will shift from innovative CSR actions and invest in altruistic CSR actions when they face
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external global pressure - human rights concerns -. Moreover, if rms also have to face short
time conditions then rms will also prefer to invest in altruistic actions for a quick response
and choose not to invest in more costly and long term development of a new responsible
business or product.
In Table 4 we show our results of the robustness check of our previous regression
analysis. We constructed our independent variables as following. For internal stakeholder
pressure we calculated the weighted sum of the employee concerns variables from the KLD
database. We changed our variable of local external stakeholder pressure which we previ-
ously measured by the number of local NGOs and we use now the weighted sum of the
local community concerns data from the KLD database. In order measure global external
stakeholder pressure we calculated again the weighted sum of the human concerns variables
from the KLD database. Our results are robust, we obtained similar conclusions as previ-
ously. The only di¤erence we could observe in the signicance of the positive relationship
between our new measure of local community pressure and innovative CSR, here it is only
signicant on p<0.1 level while in our previous regression in Table 3 using local NGOs we
nd a stronger positive relationship on p<0.01 signicance level.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study we analyze the relationship between geographically distant institu-
tional pressures and, the altruistic and innovative CSR actions of the rms.
Firms face pressure coming from internal and external stakeholders to behave
ethical and responsible as a result of the increased societal requirements. In previous re-
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search in CSR and institutional theory the increased pressure on rms coming from distinct
sources from institutional actors is often discussed (Marquis et al., 2007; Porter and Kramer,
2006). Also, the motivation of rms and the strategies that rms apply to engage in CSR
is often the center of discussion (Carroll, 1991; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). In our study we
extend this discussion and ll an important research gap by introducing the geographical
distance of institutional pressure to analyze CSR actions of the rms - we identied internal
and external institutional pressures -. The geographical aspect of institutional pressures is
important because rms depending on the location of the pressure react di¤erently. We ar-
gue that rms in order to respond to these pressures will use either altruistic or innovative
CSR actions depending on the visibility, cost structures and time conditions of each actions
type towards the pressure groups.
In our study we found conrmation that rms apply altruistic CSR actions
when the institutional pressure is coming from external stakeholder groups - local or global
-. Whereas we also found support for rms investing in innovative CSR actions when
the pressure comes from internal stakeholder groups - employees - or from local external
stakeholder groups NGOs -.
Our ndings have several implications for managers. This study helps to
develop a better understanding about the structure of CSR that is crucial for a successful
rm. First, when a rm decides to invest in CSR it has to be aware of a proper typology
among these actions. For this reason we provide our own CSR typology that separates
altruistic and innovative CSR actions. Altruistic CSR di¤ers from innovative CSR in its
visibility, cost structure and time conditions towards stakeholder groups and accordingly
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may provide distinct social and economic benets for the rm. Therefore, a rm has to
evaluate properly the relationships with its geographically distant stakeholder groups and
choose a correct CSR action. In this way rms will not only be able to tighten important
institutional ties, but also gain legitimacy from the society for a long term commitment.
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Chapter 3
Measuring the tangible outcomes
of CSR: Linking CSR to rm
performance and advertising
Abstract
Prior literature has not reached an agreement on the e¤ect of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
on rm performance. In this paper we show that CSR contributes negatively to rm performance if using
ROA, ROE, ROS and Tobins q. On the other hand, CSR contributes positively to the advertising e¤ects
of the rm if using trademark introduction as our dependent variable. Our ndings are robust.
Keywords: Advertising e¤ort; CSR; Firm performance.
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3.1 Introduction
Social responsibility has been often studied in the context of public companies
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Researchers reviewed theo-
retical and empirical implications of CSR investments to observe their potential benets.
However, prior studies analyzing the CSR - rm performance link have not reached an
agreement. In some cases prior studies found a positive (Berman et al., 1999; Waddock and
Graves, 1997), in other cases a neutral (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000) and again various
studies reported a negative relationship (Vance, 1975) between the two variables.
This lack of consensus about the potential nancial benets of CSR makes a central
question even more urging for rms: How can CSR contribute to the rmssurvival? This
is a critical issue for rms because they face a growing pressure from stakeholder groups
representing diverse interests and hereby creating a challenge for rms to make investment
decisions about CSR.
Nevertheless with these issues rms also have to face other uncertainties. These
uncertainties are related to the conicting views about the extent to which rms are ex-
pected to engage in responsibilities towards the society. These misalighnments in views are
grounded in the diversity of the theoretical backgrounds connecting rm business actions
to socially responsible actions. Such as for instance, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984),
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) resource based view of the rm (Barney,
1991) and an economic perspective of prot maximization (Friedman, 1970). For these
reasons rms have to deal with a complex issue where CSR still remains embedded in an
unfolded context.
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In this study we aim to analyze the relationship between corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) and the nancial and advertising outcome measures on the rm level. Our
objective is to nd evidence about the ability of CSR to contribute to the competitive ad-
vantage of the rms.We discuss the prior empirical literature on the CSR - rm performance
link and extend it by using a variety of measures to develop a clear understanding about
CSR investments and the potential outcomes of those.
In our empirical setting we use a panel dataset including 132 of the largest U.S.
based rms taken from the S&P 500 rms list during a nine year period from 2000 to 2008.
In order to create our dataset we used data from four secondary databases, which are, 1)
the Kinder, Lyndenberg and Domini (KLD) database to measure social responsibility of the
rms;2) the Fortune magazines Americas Most Admired Companies (AMAC) list to ob-
tain data on the reputation of the rms; 3) the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce
(USPTO) online database for data on new trademark introduction and 4) the Compustat
database to obtain nancial data on the rm level. Our ndings show a negative relation-
ship between CSR and rm performance and a positive relationship between CSR and the
advertising e¤orts of the rms. We argue that a negative relationship between CSR and
rm performance can have various explanations and does not suggest that rms should not
invest in CSR actions. The positive relationship between CSR and the advertising e¤orts
of the rms we explain by that CSR is closely tied to the intangible outocmes of the rms
(e.g. repuation, branding, marketing) and will show a positive e¤ect when directly linked
to these outcomes. We discuss our empirical setting more in detail and give an extensive
explanation about our ndings in the following sections. In section one we review the prior
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empirical literature on the CSR - rm performance link; in section two we describe our data
and methodology; in section three we state our hypotheses; in secton four we discuss our
results and nally in section ve we conclude.
3.2 Literature review
As we referred to it in the previous section of introduction, rms face a complex
decision making process when they invest in CSR activities, which is also reected in the
prior literature on CSR (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Peloza, 2009). Factors such as measurement
di¢ culties of the outcomes, opposing stakeholder interests, unclear denitions, and di¤ering
perceptions about rm responsibilities towards the society inuences the complexity of
investing accurately in CSR. For these reasons we believe that it is highly relevant to study
the outcomes of corproate social responsibility.
However prior literature addressed the CSR-rm performance link (Hull and Rothen-
berg, 2008; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997) no agreement has
been achieved about a consistent relationship between the two variables. The mixed results
in the sign of the relationship between CSR and rm performance can be observed not only
in those research studies that use di¤erent data sources to measure CSR, but also in those
studies that used the same (Ullman, 1985). The di¤erences can be due to various issues,
such as using a variety of methods, time frames, rm samples or the set of control variables
included in the regression analysis. The reasons of the lack of a common consensus about
a steady relationship are often argued among researchers.
In this section we review the ndings of prior empirical studies and their arguments
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about the link between CSR-rm performance in order to give a deeper insight on the
problem presented in the current paper. We structure our literature review by separating
prior studies by their ndings. We separate studies that found a positive, a neutral or a
negative relationship between CSR and rm performance. Additionally, we also discuss
the relationship between CSR and a di¤erent outcome measure which is new trademark
introduction and we use it as a proxy for the advertising e¤orts of the rms.
3.2.1 Positive relationship between CSR and rm performance
Prior studies which argue a positive relationship between CSR and rm perfor-
mance base their beliefs on the capability of CSR to strenghten rm competitive advantage
and the fact that it provides higher nancial benets than the costs incurred. The paper
by Waddock and Graves (1997) is one of the most inuential works which supports this
ideology and analyses the CSR-performance link. The authors found a positive relationship
between CSR and rm performance. The study uses data from the KLD database to mea-
sure CSR applying a weighted measure constructed by an expert panel of researchers and
Compustat data to meaure ROA, ROE and ROS, all three are acounting measures of rm
performance. The authors also control for rm size, risk and industry that can inuence the
relationship. In their results the authors found a positive relationsip also about the reverse
causality between CSR and rm performance (rm performancet 1 - CSRt and CSRt 1 -
rm performancet).
An important study by Berman et al. (1999) also examined the relationship of
CSR to rm nancial performance. The authors used the same database to construct their
measures of CSR as in the previously mentioned study by Waddock and Graves (1997).
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However the study of Berman et al. (1999) takes into account ve stakeholder categories
from the KLD database and introduces them simultaneously in their regression analysis to
observe their individual e¤ects on nancial performance of the rms. Their measure of CSR
represents ve categories, namely, employees, diversity, local communities, environment, and
product. The results showed that only two of the ve CSR categories, the employees and
the product categories, have a direct positive e¤ect on rm performance when controlling
for the strategic environment of the rms.
A meta-analysis of 52 studies by Orlitzky et al. (2003) focused on the CSR-
performance link across studies to nd evidence about the consistency of the sign in the
analyzed studies. The authors reported an overall positive relationship between the two
variables and clearly rejected a negative relationship between them.
3.2.2 Neutral relationship between CSR and rm performance
Beside the prior studies reporting a direct positive relationship between CSR and
nancial performance a series of other studies found neutral or negative relationships be-
tween the two variables. Arguments for a neutral relationship between the two variables
usually argue that there are other factors which inuence a direct e¤ect of CSR on per-
formance and that CSR is not directly related to nancial perfromance. Building on the
ndings of Waddock and Graves (1997) a study by McWilliams and Siegel (2000) found no
relationship between CSR and rm performance when controlling for the rms R&D expen-
diture and the advertising expenses. An indirect relationship between the two by exploring
mediator or moderator e¤ects of various factors was also addressed before.
An inuential study by Surroca et al. (2010) show that intangible resources mea-
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sured by innovation, human capital, and culture fully mediate the relationship between CSR
and rm performance. While Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) looked at the mediating role
of customer satisfaction and the moderating e¤ect of corporate abilities on the relationship
between CSR and the rm market value. In their model CSR was fully mediated by cus-
tomer satisfaction and found mixed results for the moderating e¤ect of corporate abilities
on CSR and rm performance.
3.2.3 Negative relationship between CSR and rm performance
In those studies that predicted a negative relationship between CSR and rm per-
formance the main arguments rely on the economic baseline thinking that the rms only
social responsibility is to increase prots (Friedman,1970). Researchers argue three main
issues in the economic eld why rms should not engage in CSR actions (Margolis and
Walsh, 2003). First they point out that rms by maximizing their prots fulll their oblig-
ations to the societal welfare; second that to take care of the economically disadvantaged is
the governments role and; third, that rm engagements in CSR actions should be clearly
communicated to the shareholders as a possible generator of negative income (Margolis and
Walsh, 2003).
If we assume that the rms goal is to maximize their prots then in order to look
at social responsibility as a resource that contributes to the competitive advantage and the
performance of the rms it should be economically measurable. However those researchers
who believe that CSR has a negative e¤ect on rm performance argue that the nancial
benets of CSR are lower then the costs incurred and that there are no tangible nancial
outcomes of CSR that could be measured to exceed the costs of investments in such actions.
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A newspaper article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) by Aneel Karnani in 2010 gives strong
arguments of rms motivations to invest in social responsibility which is not to do good
but to increase rm prots. Karnani (WSJ, 2010) argues that rms mask their prot
maximizing intentions with CSR but in fact rms involve themselves in such actions only
to increase their nancial benets. Which means that rms remain interested in increasing
social welfare only until the point where they can also generate prot from it and therefore
it might be the case, that the societys expectations about rm CSR involvements are not
coherent. Some rms are able to increase their prots by doing good, but in many cases
they are not which will force them to give up a part of their prots.
A study by Freedman and Jaggi (1982) found a negative association between rms
pollution performance and rm nancial perfromance, coherent with the above described
view.
3.2.4 Relationship between CSR and intangible outcomes
As we mentioned it before, in our current paper we look at two types of outcome
measures regarding CSR. First, we examine the link between CSR and rm performance
and second, we look at the relationship between CSR and advertising e¤orts of the rms.
Advertising e¤orts are the outcomes of rmsinvestments in advertising. In our study we
measure advertising e¤orts by trademark ling data on a yearly basis between 2000 and
2008, which we obtained from the USPTO database. We look at the relationship between
CSR and the advertsing e¤orts of the rms to show that CSR actions are directly tied to
the intangible outcomes of the rms. Intangible outcomes can be for instance an increase
in reputation, trust or stronger rm or brand indentity.
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In prior research, data on trademark introduction was used either to proxy for
innovation outcome (Malmberg, 2005) or for advertising outcomes (Fosfuri and Giarratana,
2009). Malmberg (2005) reported that trademarks can be good predictors of new-to-the
rm innovations and most signicantly if the rms are selling consumer goods. Fosfuri and
Giarratana (2009) used data on led trademarks to measure new advertising e¤orts of rms.
In their ndings they show that new advertising is related to the rmsnancial market
value through market size e¤ects.
In our current study we claim that CSR actions of the rms support advertising
e¤orts in a positive way. We believe that CSR can contribute to the creation of a valuable
rm image and therefore it will be positively related to the advertising e¤orts of the rms.
CSR should reinforce the advertising e¤orts of the rms.
3.3 Hypotheses
Our aim is to observe the relationship between CSR and nancial and advertising
outcome measures on the rm level, to see whether CSR contributes to the tangible and
intangible beneifts of the rms. As we discussed it in the literature review section, prior
research found mixed results about the sign and signicance of the relationship between CSR
and rm performance (Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000;Waddock
and Graves, 1997). Therefore in order to observe an existing relationship between CSR
and rm performance, we hypothesize all the three possibilities that were reported in prior
studies:
H1a: CSR is postiviely related to rm performance.
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H1b: CSR is not related to rm performance.
H1c: CSR is negatively related to rm performance.
We hypothesize that there exist a positive relationship between the CSR actions
and the advertising e¤orts of the rms which we measure by trademark introduction. With
this relationship we want to highlight the intangible benets of CSR to the rm that are
not captured when CSR is directly linked to rm performance. We hypothesize that:
H2: CSR is positively relted to the advertising e¤orts of the rm.
3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Data description
In order to analyze the relationship between CSR and di¤erent outcome variables
we use a set of 132 companies (1056 rm year observations) from the S&P 500 list of largest
U.S. companies. We created a panel dataset of nine years from 2000 to 2008 using four
databases. Namely the KLD, the USPTO, the Fortunes Most Admired Companies and the
Compustat databases.
We use rms from the S&P 500 list in order to capture the largest investments in
CSR among publicly traded rms. We constrain our rm sample to 132 rms because of
the restrictions of the data availability across the three above mentioned databases in the
nine years period from 2000 to 2008.
Dependent variables: To measure the nancial performance of the rms we use a
variety of measures. We assess the following accounting measures. Return on assets (ROA)
is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets of the rms. This nancial measure of
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rm performance is widely used in the management literature (Waddock and Graves, 1997;
Orlitzky et al., 2003). Our measures of return on equity (ROE) representing the ratio
of net income to shareholders equity and return on sales (ROS) the ratio of net income
to sales are two alternative nancial measures that we use in our regression analysis. We
obtained the data to create our measures, ROA, ROE and ROS from the Compustat North
American database. We also mesaure the market value of the frims with our dependent
variable of Tobins q. We constructed our measure of Tobins q as indicated in Surroca
et al. (2010). To measure the branding e¤ort of the rms we use data on new trademark
introduction from the USPTO database and created our dependent variable TM Intro.
We collected the number of newly led trademarks for each rm on a yearly basis.
Independent variable: In order to measure CSR we use data from the KLD data-
base. This database is widely used among researchers to measure CSR (Waddock and
Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Surroca et al. 2010). The database has seven
major issue areas: community, corporate governance, employees, diversity, environment, hu-
man rights, and product and provides information on rm involvement in six controversial
business issues: alcohol, gambling, rearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco. For our
study we focus on the seven major issue areas of the database. Each issue area has strengths
and concerns variables expressed as binary 0/1 variables.We construct our measure of CSR
by summing the strengths variables from all seven issue areas of KLD: community, corpo-
rate governance, employees, diversity, environment, human rights and product. We take the
one year lag (t-1) of our independent variable to interact it with the dependent variables in
time t.
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Control variables: We control for the size of the rms by measuring the log of
rms total assets (Size). This measure was applied by prior studies (Waddock and Graves,
1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). We expect that the size of the rm is negatively
related to rm performance. We also control for innovation, rm risk, reputation, previous
nancial performance, and time e¤ects. For innovation, we control for using the ratio of the
R&D expenditure of the rms to the total number of employees (Innovation). Innovation
was previously found to be positively related to rm performance (McWilliams and Siegel,
2000; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008) and therefore it is important to control for it in order
to avoid inconsistent ndings about the e¤ect of CSR on rm performance. Firm risk was
introduced in our regression analysis as a control variable as prior studies to control for
the extent to which rms are willing to invest in CSR actions. We measure risk (Risk)
as the ratio of rm debt to its total assets. We obtained data on the reputation of the
rms from the Fortunes magazines Americas Most Admired Companies list. The Fortune
magazines measure of reputaiton is commonly used at the company level to control for
reputational factors (Reputation). Previous nancial performance controls for the fact
that CSR investments of large rms might reect good nancial performance in the previous
period (ROAt 1; ROEt 1; ROSt 1). We take a one year lag (t-1) of our control variables
to interact them with the dependent variables in time t.
3.4.2 Model selection
We use regression analysis to test the relationship between CSR and the outcome
variables described in the previous sections. We use OLS regression analysis to introduce the
accounting nancial measures as the dependent variables (ROA, ROE, ROS and Tobins
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Variables Mean Std. Dev. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
1.ROA 5.96 9.29 1
2.ROE 18.24 35.31 0.596*** 1
3.ROS 0.51 0.24 0.796*** 0.422*** 1
4.Tobin's q 13.41 39.02 -0.0135 -0.0527 -0.0359 1
5.TM Intro 19.49 42.78 0.107*** 0.0607* 0.0616* -0.0522 1
6.CSRt-1 4.37 3.51 0.0514 0.00894 0.0750* -0.0911** 0.195*** 1
7.Public CSRt-1 2.95 2.61 0.0854** 0.0567 0.0947** -0.0942** 0.217*** 0.942*** 1
8.Non-P. CSRt-1 1.42 1.38 -0.0302 -0.0847** 0.0124 -0.0545 0.0894** 0.773*** 0.517*** 1
9.Reputationt-1 0.36 0.87 0.125*** 0.118*** 0.0936** -0.0223 0.0647* 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.139*** 1
10.Innovationt-1 -5.77 1.21 -0.0504 -0.131*** 0.00138 0.136*** 0.0158 0.117*** 0.101** 0.109*** -0.136*** 1
11.Sizet-1 9.55 1.95 0.0452 -0.00403 0.0874** -0.0839** 0.0614* 0.459*** 0.430*** 0.361*** 0.256*** -0.162*** 1
12.Riskt-1 0.17 0.12 -0.181*** 0.0967** -0.129*** -0.194*** -0.00487 -0.00645 0.0160 -0.0468 0.00965 -0.332*** 0.0128 1
13.ROAt-1 6.31 8.81 0.632*** 0.371*** 0.496*** 0.0134 0.0953** 0.0837** 0.110*** 0.00500 0.109*** -0.0400 0.0528 -0.179*** 1
14.ROEt-1 18.34 32.48 0.370*** 0.476*** 0.253*** -0.0412 0.0446 0.0239 0.0752* -0.0813** 0.106*** -0.131*** 0.00731 0.121*** 0.576*** 1
15.ROSt-1 0.05 0.23 0.498*** 0.249*** 0.523*** -0.0114 0.0550 0.0922** 0.108*** 0.0319 0.0782* -0.0141 0.0922** -0.119*** 0.792*** 0.411*** 1
16.TM totalt-1 34.22 81.01 0.102*** 0.0599 0.0608* -0.0578 0.935*** 0.182*** 0.219*** 0.0503 0.0408 0.0532 0.0470 0.00902 0.0949** 0.0468 0.0549 1
q). Giving that our variable TM Intro is a count dependent variable, we use negative
binomial regression to analyse the relationship between CSR and trademark introduction.
Because the mean and variance equality required for a Poisson model does not hold in the
case of our dependent variable TM introwe applied negative binomial regression analysis
(Greene, 2002). After conducting the Hausman-test we applied rm and time xed-e¤ects
estimations through our analysis.
3.5 Results
We present the descriptive statistics of mean and standard deviation and the corre-
lation matrix of our variables in Table 1. The Pearson correlation coe¢ cients are presented
on three signicance levels of the p-value (p<0.01***, p<0.5** and p<0.1*). From the
correlation matrix we can see that CSR has a direct e¤ect on p<0.1 level of signicance on
return on sales (ROS) and on p<0.01 level of signicance on new trademark introduction
(TM Intro).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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We show the results of Hypotheses 1a;b;c and Hypothesis 2 in Table 2. We used
xed-e¤ects OLS regression to analyze H1a;b;c and we used xed-e¤ects negative binomial
regression to analyze H2. The results of our regression analyses demonstrate that CSR
negatively a¤ects rm performance across di¤erent performance measures (ROA; ROE;
ROS; Tobins q) conrming Hypothesis 1c and by this rejecting Hypotheses 1a and 1b. As
we discussed it in the literature review section, this negative relationship is argued by the
rms perception of CSR as a cost generated (Friedman, 1970; Karnani, 2010 WSJ). This
nding can have several explanations. First, one explanation can be of why CSR actions of
the rms are negatively related to perfromance is because rms invest in social projects that
will show a positive strategic outcome over a longer period of time that we do not cover in
the present study. These new socially responsible project or product innovations take time
to show their prot generating benets and are initially percieved as a cost for the rms.
An other explanation for a negative relationship can be that rms are reacting more quickly
to stakeholder pressures with investing in altruistic CSR in form of cash donations which do
not have a direct impact on rm performance and are percieved as a cost. We argue that
our nsing of a negative relationship between CSR and rm performance does not imply
that rms should not invest in CSR, but rather suggest that they have to follow a strategic
path that is nancially benetial both, to the rm and to the society as well. Firms should
not engage in social actions because of purely altruistic motives because it will negatively
inuence their performance, but rms should consider CSR as an opportunity to enhance
performance in a socially responsible way.
The ndings conrm our hypothesis about the relationship between CSR and
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the advertising e¤orts of the rms (H2). We nd a positive relationship between the two
variables which is consistent with our previous argument that CSR is a support mechanism
for the rm to enhance other types of rm level outcomes than performance by contributing
for instance to their advertising outcome.
In Table 3 we show the results of the robustness check of our regression analysis.
We changed our independent variable and applied now the weighted sum of the CSR variable
that we used in our previous regression from the KLD database. Our results are robust, we
obtained similar outcomes as previously shown in Table 2.
We would also like to highlight some of our results related to our control variables.
For instance our measure of Innovation is positively related to rm performance (ROA;
ROS). The size of the rms is negatively related to rm performance and positively related
to trademark introduction, that is the larger the rm the more trademark it les. And we
also observe that prior perfromance (t-1) is positively related to the present perfromance
(t).
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Table 2: Estimation results of the impact of CSR on di¤erent outcome measures.
Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5.
ROA ROE ROS Tobins q TM Intro
CSR -0.553*** -1.339** -0.0119*** -1.369** 0.0188*
(0.149) (0.602) (0.00459) (0.634) (0.0114)
Reputation 0.378 1.941 0.00889 -2.283 0.0120
(0.333) (1.344) (0.0102) (1.414) (0.0266)
Innovation 2.121** 5.261 0.0639** 3.690 -0.0814
(0.882) (3.549) (0.0272) (3.751) (0.0518)
Size -0.648* -2.631* -0.0177* -4.946*** 0.0449*
(0.337) (1.363) (0.0104) (1.434) (0.0251)
Risk -7.203** -1.577 -0.0512 37.84*** -0.151
(3.394) (13.65) (0.104) (14.43) (0.297)
ROAt-1 0.344*** 0.111 -0.0368
(0.0329) (0.140) (0.0292)
ROEt-1 0.122***
(0.0338)
ROSt-1 0.235***
(0.0331)
TM total 0.00243***
(0.000195)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Constant 21.13*** 68.78*** 0.557*** 84.91*** 0.094
(5.729) (23.15) (0.177) (24.36) (0.376)
Observations 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,048
R-squared 0.216 0.053 0.112 0.038
df_m 144 144 144 144 14
F 19.32 3.946 8.880 2.750
Wald chi2(14) 177.16
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Estimation results of the impact of CSR on di¤erent outcome measures.(Robust)
Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5.
ROA ROE ROS Tobins q TM Intro
CSR -4.349*** -1.037** -0.0892*** -7.382* 0.148*
(1.028) (0.416) (0.0317) (4.384) (0.0783)
Reputation 0.359 1.900 0.00854 -2.273 0.0124
(0.332) (1.343) (0.0102) (1.416) (0.0266)
Innovation 2.115** 5.258 0.0639** 3.732 -0.0821
(0.880) (3.546) (0.0272) (3.755) (0.0518)
Size -0.648* -2.631* -0.0177* -4.927*** 0.0442*
(0.337) (1.362) (0.0104) (1.435) (0.0251)
Risk -6.918** -0.812 -0.0450 38.26*** -0.168
(3.387) (13.65) (0.104) (14.45) (0.298)
ROAt-1 0.342*** 0.113 -0.0357
(0.0328) (0.140) (0.0292)
ROEt-1 0.121***
(0.0338)
ROSt-1 0.235***
(0.0330)
TM total 0.00245***
(0.000195)
Time dummies Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 21.29*** 69.13*** 0.559*** 83.79*** 0.0913
(5.715) (23.12) (0.177) (24.37) (0.376)
Observations 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,048
R-squared 0.220 0.055 0.114 0.036
df_m 144 144 144 144 14
F 19.72 4.049 8.988 2.605
Wald chi2(15) 179.23
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6 Conclusion
In our current study we aim to analyze the relationship between CSR and di¤erent
outcome measures on the rm level. As prior empirical studies found mixed results on the
CSR-rm perfromance link (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) we nd it highly relevant to further
explore this relationship. We use a variety of measures to examine how CSR a¤ects rm
performance and moreover we also introduce the outcome measure of advertising outcomes,
measured by the led trademarks of the rms.
Our rm sample consists of 132 rms from the S&P 500 list of largest U.S. rms
and covers nine years from 2000 to 2008. We collected data from a variety of databases,
such as the KLD database, the Compustat, the USPTO databases, and the Fortunes Most
Admired Company list. Our results show that CSR is negatively related to rm perfor-
mance suggesting that rms percieve CSR actions as a cost. This result can have various
explanations and do not necessarily suggest that rms should not invest in CSR. In our view
this can be understood as the conrmation of the rms needs to better align their strategies
with their CSR actions and to invest in actions that are mutually benetial for the rm
and for the society. We also nd that CSR is positively related to the advertising outcome
of the rm which reinforces our believes about that CSR works as a support system in the
communication of the rmsadvertising e¤orts towards the stakeholder groups, creating a
valuable corporate image.
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